

EAST RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL
AUDIT AND SCRUTINY COMMITTEE

11 March 2021

Report by Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer)

Treasury Management Strategy Report for 2021/22

PURPOSE OF REPORT

1. To advise the Audit and Scrutiny Committee on the treasury management strategy for the financial year 2021/22.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. It is recommended that Members:-
 - (a) Consider the content of the Treasury Management Strategy Report for 2021/22; and
 - (b) Recommend to the Council that the Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22 be approved, including the amended list of organisations for investment of surplus funds (Annex F); and
 - (c) Recommend to the Council that they approve the policy on the repayment of loans fund advances, see section 3.4

BACKGROUND

3. In line with the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice 2017, the Audit and Scrutiny Committee is responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of the treasury management strategy and policies.
4. The attached Treasury Management Strategy Report for the financial year 2021/22 is submitted in accordance with this requirement.

TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR 2021/22 (TMS)

5. The TMS for 2021/22 is attached (see Appendix 1).

EQUALITY IMPACT

6. A screening exercise has revealed that the Treasury Management Strategy has no direct relevance to the Council's equality duties

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Report Date:	February 2021
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APPENDIX 1

EAST RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL

**TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
2021/22**

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1 Background

The Council is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash received during the year will meet cash expenditure. A major aspect of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council's low risk appetite, ensuring adequate liquidity before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, being essentially longer term cash flow planning to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

“The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions, the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

2 Reporting Requirements

2.1 The Council is required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main reports on treasury activity each year, which incorporate a variety of policies as well as estimated and actual figures. These reports are as follows:-

a) **Treasury Management Strategy 2021/22** (this report).

This report is the most important of the three reports and covers:

- The capital plans of the Council (including prudential indicators);
- A policy for the statutory repayment of debt (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
- The Treasury Management Strategy (how the investments and borrowings are organised) including treasury indicators, and
- A permitted investment strategy (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).

- b) **Mid-Year Treasury Management Report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary and whether any policies require revision.
- c) **Annual Treasury Report** – This is a backward looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimate within the strategy.

2.2 Scrutiny

These reports are required to be adequately scrutinised by committee before being recommended to the Council. This role is undertaken by the Audit and Scrutiny Committee.

2.3 Capital Investment Strategy

The CIPFA revised 2017 Prudential and Treasury Management Codes require all local authorities to prepare a capital investment strategy report, which will provide the following:

- A high-level long term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital investment strategy is to ensure that all elected members fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite. An update to the Council's current Capital Investment Strategy will be presented to Council on 15 March 2021 for approval.

2.4 Treasury Management Strategy for 2021/22

The treasury management issues covered by this report are:

Capital Issues

- The capital expenditure plans and associated prudential indicators
- The loans fund repayment policy

Treasury management issues

- The current treasury position
- Treasury indicators which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council
- Prospects for interest rates
- The borrowing strategy
- Policy on borrowing in advance of need
- Debt rescheduling
- The investment strategy and
- Credit Worthiness Policy

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, the CIPFA Prudential Code (the Prudential Code), the CIPFA Treasury Management Code and Scottish Government Investment Regulations.

2.5 Treasury Management Consultants

The Council uses the Link Group, Treasury Solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the Council at all times and will ensure that it does not rely solely upon information and advice from its treasury advisors.

It also recognises however that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to gain access to specialist skills and resources. The Council will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

2.6 Council and Subsidiary Organisations

The Treasury Management Strategy covers the treasury management activities for the Council (including any subsidiary organisations i.e. East Renfrewshire Culture & Leisure Trust).

3 The Capital Prudential Indicators 2021/22 – 2025/26

The Council's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members to overview and confirm them.

A summary of the indicators can be found in Annex A

3.1 Capital Expenditure (Prudential Indicator PI-1)

This prudential indicator is a summary of the Council's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously and those forming part of this budget cycle. The indicator also includes expenditure financed by PFI and leasing type arrangements which, for the purposes of financial planning and reporting, must be treated as capital expenditure.

The following capital expenditure forecasts are in line with the housing capital plan 2021/22- 2030/31 which was approved by Council on 25 February 2021 and the general fund capital plan 2021/22 – 2030/31 which will be submitted to Council on 15 March 2021.

Capital Expenditure (PI-1) £'000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
General Fund – Capital Programme – Other Relevant Expenditure	37,347 2,972	31,936	41,286	63,386	58,918	28,152	12,374
General Fund Subtotal	40,319	31,936	41,286	63,386	58,918	28,152	12,374
Housing	9,485	7,262	18,499	27,313	14,457	4,823	5,465
Total	49,804	39,198	59,785	90,699	73,375	32,975	17,839

3.2 Capital Financing Assumptions

The table below summarises the capital expenditure plans for the general fund and how these plans are being financed. Any shortfall of resources results in a funding borrowing need.

General Fund £'000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Capital Expenditure	37,347	31,936	41,286	63,386	58,918	28,152	12,374
Other Relevant Expenditure	2,972						
Total	40,319	31,936	41,286	63,386	58,918	28,152	12,374
Financed by:							
Capital Receipts	248	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capital Reserve	1,200	0	0	0	0	0	0
Developer Contributions	1,422	1,475	954	906	724	734	724
Govt. General Capital Grant	7,957	5,339	5,336	5,336	5,336	5,336	5,336
Govt. Specific Capital Grants	7,280	5,630	3,409	2,948	2,834	2,677	848
Other Grants & Contributions	216	0	0	0	0	0	0
Repairs & Renewals Fund/CFCR	1,189	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net Borrowing Requirement for the year	20,807	19,492	31,587	54,196	50,024	19,405	5,466

As part of the long term capital planning process, the 2020/21 probable capital outturn has been calculated using the General Fund capital monitoring report approved by Cabinet on 4 March 2021.

The table below summarises the capital expenditure plans for housing and how these plans are being financed. Any shortfall of resources results in a borrowing requirement.

Housing £'000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Capital Expenditure	9,485	7,262	18,499	27,313	14,457	4,823	5,465
Financed by:							
Capital Receipts – Right to Buy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capital Receipts – Land Disposal	5	0	0	500	500	500	500
Recharges to Owners	0	381	100	100	100	100	100
Govt. Specific Capital Grants	1,425	2,576	7,447	8,331	1,994	140	140
Commuted Sums							
CFCR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Net Borrowing Requirement for the year	8,055	4,305	10,952	18,382	11,863	4,083	4,725

The table below summarises the borrowing requirement resulting from both the general fund (including PFI and leasing type arrangements) and housing capital plans.

Borrowing Requirement £'000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
General Fund	20,807	19,492	31,587	54,196	50,024	19,405	5,466
Housing	8,055	4,305	10,952	18,382	11,863	4,083	4,725
Net Borrowing Requirement for the year	28,862	23,797	42,539	72,578	61,887	23,488	10,191

3.3 The Council's Borrowing Requirement (The Capital Financing Requirement – Prudential Indicator PI-2)

The second prudential indicator is the Council's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Council's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure identified above, which has not immediately been paid for (e.g. via grants), will increase the CFR.

The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as prudent annual repayments from revenue need to be made which reflect the useful life of capital assets financed by borrowing. From 1 April 2016 authorities may choose whether to use scheduled debt amortisation (loans pool charges) or another suitable method of calculation in order to repay borrowing.

The CFR includes any other long term liabilities (e.g. PPP schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Council's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the PFI, PPP lease provider and so the Council is not required to separately borrow for these

schemes. The Council has liabilities of £88.701m relating to such schemes as at 31 March 2020.

The Council is asked to approve the CFR projections below:

Capital Financing Requirement (PI-2) £'000	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
General Fund	168,882	177,890	199,463	243,853	282,475	290,425	283,779
Housing	34,171	35,538	43,636	58,792	66,959	66,866	67,250
Total CFR (PI-2)*	203,053	213,428	243,099	302,645	349,434	357,291	351,029

Net borrowing requirement for the year (above)		23,797	42,539	72,578	61,887	23,488	10,191
Less scheduled debt amortisation and other financing movements		(13,422)	(12,868)	(13,032)	(15,098)	(15,631)	(16,453)
Movement in CFR		10,375	29,671	59,546	46,789	7,857	(6,262)

*The CFR for this calculation includes capital expenditure to 31 March of each financial year.

3.4 Statutory Repayment of Loans Fund Advances

The Council is required to set out its policy for the statutory repayment of loans fund advances prior to the start of the financial year. The repayment of loans fund advances ensures that the Council makes a prudent provision each year to pay off an element of the accumulated loans fund advances made in previous financial years.

A variety of options are provided to Councils so long as a prudent provision is made each year. The Council is recommended to approve the following policy on the repayment of loans fund advances:-

- For loans fund advances made before 1 April 2016, the policy will be to maintain the practice of previous years and apply the Statutory Method (in line with Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975), with all loans fund advances being repaid by the annuity method in line with the repayment profile determined in previous years.
- Loans fund advances relating to City Deal projects which will be supported in later years by Government funding will be repaid in accordance with the funding/income profile method. This links the repayments to the project income stream.
- For loans fund advances made after 1 April 2016, excluding the above, the Council will continue to calculate loan charge repayments in line with Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975, using an annuity rate of 4%. The Council is permitted to use this option for new borrowing taken out over a transitional period of five years until 31 March 2021. Thereafter a new policy

approach based on asset life periods will be adopted for any further new borrowing.

Additionally, the Scottish Government has granted various flexibilities to help address the current Covid-19 pressures which will impact on loan fund payments charged in 2020/21 and beyond. These fiscal flexibilities will relate to:-

- Capital Receipts. Capital receipts received in both 2020/21 and 2021/22 can be used to fund Covid-19 related revenue expenditure
- Loans Fund Principal Repayment Holiday. Councils can defer loans fund principal repayments due in either 2020/21 or 2021/22 (but not both years) and repay that deferred amount in future financial years
- Credit Arrangements. Council payments for service concessions, such as PFI type deals, include an element of debt repayment. This debt is paid over the life of the contract but approval has now been given to repay this debt over the life of the asset instead which would be a longer period.

The Non-HRA loans fund balances are expected to be, with year 1 being 2020/21:

£'000	Year 1	Years 2-5	Years 5-10	Years 10-15	Years 15-20	Years 20+
opening balance	80,183	94,054	214,297	214,857	190,062	166,923
advances	19,492	135,807	32,285	4,073	-	-
repayments	(5,621)	(15,564)	(31,725)	(28,868)	(23,139)	(166,923)
closing balance	94,054	214,297	214,857	190,062	166,923	-

The HRA loans fund balances are expected to be, with year 1 being 2020/21:

£'000	Year 1	Years 2-5	Years 5-10	Years 10-15	Years 15-20	Years 20+
opening balance	34,171	35,538	66,959	68,543	63,865	46,318
advances	4,305	41,197	17,417	11,369	-	-
repayments	(2,938)	(9,776)	(15,833)	(16,047)	(17,547)	(46,318)
closing balance	35,538	66,959	68,543	63,865	46,318	-

4 Borrowing

Section 3 provides a summary of the capital expenditure plans. The treasury management function ensures that the Council's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional Codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet service activity and the Council's Capital Investment Strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury/prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

4.1 Current Portfolio Position

The Council's actual and projected debt portfolio is summarised below. The table compares the actual and projected external debt against the Council's estimated borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement – CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

£'000 as at 31 March	2019/20 Actual	2020/21 Probable	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Borrowing	114,788	114,227	143,843	201,015	247,638	247,623	247,607
Other Long Term Liabilities	88,699	83,836	78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598	56,750
Total Gross Debt (Prudential Indicator PI-3)	203,487	198,063	222,594	274,560	315,816	310,221	304,357
CFR – the borrowing need	203,053	213,428	243,099	302,645	349,434	357,291	351,029
(Under) / Over Borrowing (Prudential Indicator PI-6)	434	(15,365)	(20,505)	(28,085)	(33,618)	(47,070)	(46,672)

Within the range of prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Council operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these (PI-3) is that the Council needs to ensure that its gross debt figure (shown above) does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2021/22 and following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded by external loan debt as the cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy remains both prudent and cost effective as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is relatively high.

4.2 Treasury Indicators: Limits to Borrowing Activity

a) The Operational Boundary (Prudential Indicator PI-4)

This indicator takes account of capital expenditure and financing requirements and projects the expected level of external debt for operational purposes. Temporary breaches of the operational boundary may occur as a result of unexpected cash movements. The Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) has delegated authority to manage the movement between borrowing and other long term liabilities such as finance leases in accordance with option appraisal and value for money considerations if it is considered appropriate. Any such movement will be reported to Council following the change.

Operational boundary for external debt (PI-4) £'000	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Borrowing	163,947	229,154	280,870	293,957	293,556
Other Long Term Liabilities	83,836	78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598
Total	247,783	307,905	354,415	362,135	356,154

b) The Authorised Limit for External Debt (Prudential indicator PI-5)

This is a key prudential indicator and represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. It is similar to the operational boundary but includes further headroom to accommodate adverse cash flow movements and opportunities for advance borrowing. It represents a legal limit which external debt is prohibited to exceed and reflects the level of external borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. In circumstances where a breach takes place the reasons shall be reported to the next meeting of the Council and the limit revised if appropriate.

The authorised limits for external debt for the current year and two subsequent years are the legislation limits determined under Regulation 6(1) of the Local Authority (Capital Finance and Accountancy) (Scotland) Regulation 2016.

The proposed Authorised Limit for the Council is as follows:

Authorised limit for external debt (PI-5) £'000	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate	2023/24 Estimate	2024/25 Estimate	2025/26 Estimate
Borrowing	188,539	263,527	323,001	338,051	337,589
Other Long Term Liabilities	83,836	78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598
Total	272,375	342,278	396,546	406,229	400,187

4.3 Prospects for Interest Rates

The Council has appointed the Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. **Annex B** draws together a number of current city forecasts for short term (Base Rate) and longer fixed interest rates and the following table and commentary below gives the central view of the Link Group in November 2020

Link Group Interest Rate View		9.11.20											
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20													
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60

The coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March to cut Bank Rate to first 0.25%, and then to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings to 16th December, although some forecasters had suggested that a cut into negative territory could happen. However, the Governor of the Bank of England has made it clear that he currently thinks that such a move would do more damage than good and that more quantitative easing is the favoured tool if further action becomes necessary. As shown in the forecast table above, no increase in Bank Rate is expected in the forecast table above as economic recovery is expected to be only gradual and, therefore, prolonged.

Gilt yields / PWLB rates

There was much speculation during the second half of 2019 that bond markets were in a bubble which was driving bond prices up and yields down to historically very low levels. The context for that was a heightened expectation that the US could have been heading for a recession in 2020. In addition, there were growing expectations of a downturn in world economic growth, especially due to fears around the impact of the trade war between the US and China, together with inflation generally at low levels in most countries and expected to remain subdued. Combined, these conditions were conducive to very low bond yields. While inflation targeting by the major central banks has been successful over the last thirty years in lowering inflation expectations, the real equilibrium rate for central rates has fallen considerably due to the high level of borrowing by consumers. This means that central banks do not need to raise rates as much now to have a major impact on consumer spending, inflation, etc. The consequence of this has been the gradual lowering of the overall level of interest rates and bond yields in financial markets over the last 30 years. Over the year prior to the coronavirus crisis, this has seen many bond yields up to 10 years turn negative in the Eurozone. In addition, there has, at times, been an inversion of bond yields in the US whereby 10 year yields have fallen below shorter term yields. In the past, this has been a precursor of a recession. The other side of this coin is that bond prices are elevated as investors would be expected to be moving out of riskier assets i.e. shares, in anticipation of a downturn in corporate earnings and so selling out of equities.

Gilt yields had therefore already been on a generally falling trend up until the coronavirus crisis hit western economies during March 2020. After gilt yields spiked up during the financial crisis in March, we have seen these yields fall sharply to unprecedented lows as investors panicked during March in selling shares in anticipation of impending recessions in western economies, and moved cash into safe haven assets i.e. government bonds. However, major western central banks took rapid action to deal with excessive stress in financial markets during March, and started massive quantitative easing purchases of government bonds: this also acted to put downward pressure on government bond yields at a time when there has been a huge and quick expansion of government expenditure financed by issuing government bonds. Such unprecedented levels of issuance in “normal” times would have caused bond yields to rise sharply. Gilt yields and PWLB rates have been at remarkably low rates so far during 2020/21.

As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is expected to be little upward movement in PWLB rates over the next two years as it will take economies, including the UK, a prolonged period to recover all the momentum they have lost in the sharp recession caused during the coronavirus shut down period. From time to time, gilt yields, and therefore PWLB rates, can be subject to exceptional levels of volatility due to geo-political,

sovereign debt crisis, emerging market developments and sharp changes in investor sentiment, (as shown on 9th November when the first results of a successful COVID-19 vaccine trial were announced). Such volatility could occur at any time during the forecast period.

Investment and borrowing rates

- **Investment returns** are likely to remain exceptionally low during 2021/22 with little increase in the following two years.
- **Borrowing interest rates** fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England: indeed, gilt yields up to 6 years were negative during most of the first half of 20/21. The unexpected increase of 100 bps in PWLB rates on top of the then current margin over gilt yields of 80 bps in October 2019, required an initial major rethink of local authority treasury management strategy and risk management and the policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years. However, on 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to a review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates; the standard and certainty margins were reduced by 1%
- **Borrowing for capital expenditure.** As Link's long-term forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%, and all PWLB rates are under 2.00%, there is value in borrowing from the PWLB for all types of capital expenditure for all maturity periods, especially as current rates are at historic lows.
- While this authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and to replace maturing debt, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances as this position will, most likely, incur a revenue cost.

4.4 Borrowing Strategy

The Council is currently maintaining an under-borrowed position. This means that the capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement), has not been fully funded by external loan debt as the cash supporting the Council's reserves, balances and cash flow has been used as a temporary measure. This strategy remains prudent as investment returns are low and counterparty risk is still an issue to be considered.

Against this background and the risks within the economic forecast, caution will be adopted with the 2021/22 treasury operations. The Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) will monitor interest rates in financial markets and adopt a pragmatic approach to changing circumstances:

- *If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a sharp **FALL** in long and short term rates, (e.g. due to a marked increase of risks around relapse into recession or of risks of deflation), then borrowing will be postponed.*
- *If it was felt that there was a significant risk of a much sharper **RISE** in long and short term rates than that currently forecast, perhaps arising from an acceleration in the rate of increase in central rates in the USA and UK, an increase in world economic activity or a sudden increase in inflation risks, then the portfolio position will be re-appraised. Most likely, fixed funding will be*

drawn whilst interest rates are lower than they are projected to be in the next few years.

Any decisions will be reported to Members at the next available opportunity.

4.5 Treasury Management Limits on Activity

There are three debt related treasury activity limits. The purpose of these is to restrain the activity of the treasury function within certain limits, thereby managing risk and reducing the impact of any adverse movement in interest rates. However, if these are set to be too restrictive, they will impair the opportunities to reduce costs / improve performance. The indicators are:

(i) Upper limits on fixed interest rate exposure (Treasury Indicator TI-1)

This covers a maximum limit for borrowing exposure to fixed interest rates, based on the debt position and is set at 100%.

(ii) Upper limits on variable interest rate exposure (Treasury Indicator TI-2)

This identified a maximum limit for borrowing exposure to variable interest rates based upon the debt position and is set at 30%.

(iii) Maturity structure of borrowing (Treasury Indicator TI-3)

Gross limits are set to reduce the Council's exposure to large fixed rate sums falling due for refinancing. The Council has set the limit of debt maturing in any one year to 15% at the time of borrowing.

4.6 Policy on borrowing in advance of need

The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs, purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed.

Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing Requirement estimates and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

The Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) has the authority to borrow in advance of need under delegated power where, for instance, a sharp rise in interest rates is expected, and so borrowing early at fixed interest rates will be economically beneficial or meet budgetary constraints. The Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) will adopt a cautious approach to any such borrowing and a business case to support the decision making process must consider:

- The benefits of borrowing in advance,
- The risks created by additional levels of borrowing and investment, and
- How far in advance it is reasonable to borrow considering the risks identified

Any such advance borrowing should be reported through the mid-year or annual Treasury Management reporting mechanism.

4.7 Debt Rescheduling

The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:

- The generation of cash savings and/or discounted cash flow savings
- Helping to fulfil the treasury strategy
- Enhance the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).

All rescheduling will be reported to Council at the earliest meeting following its action.

5 Investment Strategy

5.1 Investment Objectives and Policy

The Council's investment policy implements the requirements of the following:-

- Local Government Investments (Scotland) Regulations 2010 (and accompanying Finance Circular 5/2010),
- CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the Code")
- CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018

The above regulations and guidance place a high priority on the management of risk. The Council's investment priorities will be security first, liquidity second and then return. This authority has adopted a prudent approach to managing risk and defines its risk appetite by the following means: -

1. Minimum acceptable **credit criteria** are applied in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties. This also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the short term and long-term ratings.

2. **Other information:** ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Council will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "**credit default swaps**" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.

3. **Other information sources** used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

4. This authority has defined the list of **types of investment instruments** that are permitted investments authorised for use in Annex D. Annex E expands on the risks involved in each type of investment and the mitigating controls.

5. **Lending limits**, (amounts and maturity), for each counterparty will be set through applying the information gathered (see points 1-3 above)

6. This authority has engaged **external consultants**, (see paragraph 2.5), to provide expert advice on how to optimise an appropriate balance of security, liquidity and yield, given the risk appetite of this authority in the context of the expected level of cash balances and need for liquidity throughout the year.

7. This authority will set a limit for the amount of its investments which are invested for **longer than 365 days**, (see paragraph 5.6d).

8. The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from within the United Kingdom.

9. As a result of the change in accounting standards for 2019/20 under IFRS 9, this authority will consider the implications of investment instruments which could result in an adverse movement in the value of the amount invested and resultant charges at the end of the year to the General Fund.

However, this authority will also pursue **value for money** in treasury management and will monitor the yield from investment income against appropriate benchmarks for investment performance, (see paragraph 5.7). Regular monitoring of investment performance will be carried out during the year.

5.2 Creditworthiness Policy

The primary principle governing the Council's investment criteria is the security of its investments, although the yield or return on the investment is also a key consideration. After this main principle, the Council will ensure that:

- It maintains a policy covering both the categories of investment types it will invest in, criteria for choosing investment counterparties with adequate security, and monitoring their security as set out in the investment sections below; and
- It has sufficient liquidity in its investments. For this purpose it will set out procedures for determining the maximum periods for which funds may prudently be committed. These procedures also apply to the Council's prudential indicators covering the maximum principal sums invested.

The Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) will maintain a counterparty list in compliance with the following criteria and will revise the criteria and submit them to Council for approval as necessary (see **Annex F**). These criteria provide an overall pool of classes of counterparties considered high quality which the Council may use, rather than defining what types of investment instruments are to be used.

Credit rating information is supplied by Link Group our treasury advisors, on all active counterparties that comply with the criteria below. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria would be omitted from the counterparty (dealing) list, with the exception of the Council's own banker. Any rating changes, rating watches (notification of a likely change), rating Outlooks (notification of a longer term bias outside the central rating view) are provided to officers almost immediately after they occur and this information is considered before dealing. For instance, a negative rating watch applied to a counterparty that is already at the minimum Council criteria will be suspended from use, with all other counterparties being reviewed in light of market conditions.

The criteria for providing a pool of high quality investment counterparties are:

- Banks 1 - good credit quality – the Council will only use UK banks which have, as a minimum, the following Fitch (or equivalent) ratings (where rated):
 - i. Short Term – F1
 - ii. Long Term – A-
- Banks 2 – Part nationalised UK bank – Royal Bank of Scotland ring-fenced operations*. This bank can be included if it continues to be part nationalised or it meets the ratings in Banks 1 above.
- Banks 3 – The Council’s own banker for transactional purposes if the bank falls below the above criteria, although in this case balances will be minimised in both monetary size and time invested.
- Bank subsidiary and treasury operation - The Council will use these where the parent bank has provided an appropriate guarantee or has the necessary ratings outlined above.
- Building societies - The Council will use societies which meet the ratings for banks outlined above;
- Money Market Funds
- Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds
- UK Government (including gilts, Treasury Bills and the DMADF)
- Local authorities, including Police, Fire and the Council's subsidiary

Use of additional information other than credit ratings. Additional requirements under the Code require the Council to supplement credit rating information. Whilst the above criteria relies primarily on the application of credit ratings to provide a pool of appropriate counterparties for officers to use, additional operational market information will be applied before making any specific investment decision from the agreed pool of counterparties. This additional market information (for example Credit Default Swaps, negative rating Watches/Outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment counterparties.

Hub Schemes. The Council also invests in hub projects, which are based on robust business cases and a cashflow from public sector organisations (i.e low risk). As additional assurance we restrict such investments to hub schemes where the Council is a significant participant.

Time and monetary limits applying to investments. The time and monetary limits for institutions on the Council’s counterparty list are as stated in **Annex F**.

UK banks – *ring fencing

The largest UK banks, (those with more than £25bn of retail / Small and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) deposits), are required, by UK law, to separate core retail banking services from their investment and international banking activities by 1st January 2019. This is known as “ring-fencing”. Whilst smaller banks with less than £25bn in deposits are exempt, they can choose to opt up. Several banks are very close to the threshold already and so may come into scope in the future regardless.

Ring-fencing is a regulatory initiative created in response to the global financial crisis. It mandates the separation of retail and SME deposits from investment

banking, in order to improve the resilience and resolvability of banks by changing their structure. In general, simpler, activities offered from within a ring-fenced bank, (RFB), will be focused on lower risk, day-to-day core transactions, whilst more complex and “riskier” activities are required to be housed in a separate entity, a non-ring-fenced bank, (NRFB). This is intended to ensure that an entity’s core activities are not adversely affected by the acts or omissions of other members of its group.

While the structure of the banks included within this process may have changed, the fundamentals of credit assessment have not. The Council will continue to assess the new-formed entities in the same way that it does others and those with sufficiently high ratings, (and any other metrics considered), will be considered for investment purposes.

5.3 Country and Council’s Banker

a) Country Limits –

The Council has determined that it will only use approved counterparties from within the United Kingdom. This policy may be reviewed if the sovereign rating for the UK is downgraded to below Fitch AA -, or equivalent.

b) Council’s Own Banker

The Council’s own banker (The Clydesdale bank) will be maintained on the Council’s counterparty list in situations where rating changes mean this is below the above criteria. This is to allow the Council to continue to operate normal current account banking facilities overnight and short-term investment facilities.

5.4 The Monitoring of Investment Counterparties

All credit ratings will be monitored on a weekly basis. The Council is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the creditworthiness service of Link Asset Services.

- If a downgrade results in the counterparty / investment scheme no longer meeting the Council’s minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately.
- Additional market information (for example Credit Swaps and negative rating watches/outlooks) will be applied to compare the relative security of differing investment counterparties.

If the Council has funds invested in an institution which is downgraded to below the acceptable rating criteria, the Council will enter discussions with the counterparty to establish if the funds can be returned early. This however will be subject to an appropriate cost versus risk assessment of the specific situation.

The criteria for choosing counterparties set out above provide a sound approach to investment in “normal” market circumstances. Under exceptional market conditions, the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) may temporarily restrict further investment activity to those counterparties considered of higher credit quality than the minimum criteria set out in this Strategy. These restrictions will remain in place until the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) is of an

opinion that the banking system has returned to 'normal'. Similarly a restriction may be placed on the duration of investments.

5.5 Types of Investments

For institutions on the approved counterparty list, investments will be restricted to safer instruments (as listed in **Annex E**). Currently this involves the use of money market funds, the Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility (DMADF) and institutions with higher credit ratings than the minimum permissible rating outlines in the investment strategy, as well as the Council's own bank.

Where appropriate, investments will be made through approved brokers. The current list of approved brokers comprises:

- Sterling International Brokers Limited
- Tradition (UK) Limited
- Martins Brokers
- King and Shaxson Capital Limited
- Tullet Prebon Brokers
- Imperial Treasury Services

5.6 Investment Strategy and bank rate projections

a) In-house funds

Investments will be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates (i.e. rates for investments up to 12 months).

Greater returns are usually obtainable by investing for longer periods. While most cash balances are required in order to manage the ups and downs of cash flow, where cash sums can be identified that could be invested for longer periods, the value to be obtained from longer term investments will be carefully assessed.

- If it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to rise significantly within the time horizon being considered, then consideration will be given to keeping most investments as being short term or variable.
- Conversely, if it is thought that Bank Rate is likely to fall within that time period, consideration will be given to locking in higher rates currently obtainable, for longer periods.

b) Investment returns expectations

Bank Rate is unlikely to rise from 0.10% for a considerable period. It is very difficult to say when it may start rising so it may be best to assume that investment earnings from money market-related instruments will be sub 0.50% for the foreseeable future.

The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to about three months during each financial

year are as follows (the long term forecast is for periods over 10 years in the future):

Average earnings in each year	
2020/21	0.10%
2021/22	0.10%
2022/23	0.10%
2023/24	0.10%
2024/25	0.25%
Long term later years	2.00%

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is subject to major uncertainty due to the virus and how quickly successful vaccines may become available and widely administered to the population. It may also be affected by what deal the UK agrees as part of Brexit.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, or a return of investor confidence in equities, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

c) Negative Investment Rates

While the Bank of England said in August / September 2020 that it is unlikely to introduce a negative Bank Rate, at least in the next 6 -12 months, and in November omitted any mention of negative rates in the minutes of the meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee, some deposit accounts are already offering negative rates for shorter periods. As part of the response to the pandemic and lockdown, the Bank and the Government have provided financial markets and businesses with plentiful access to credit, either directly or through commercial banks. In addition, the Government has provided large sums of grants to local authorities to help deal with the COVID crisis; this has caused some local authorities to have sudden large increases in cash balances searching for an investment home, some of which was only very short term until those sums were able to be passed on.

As for money market funds (MMFs), yields have continued to drift lower. Some managers have already resorted to trimming fee levels to ensure that net yields for investors remain in positive territory where possible and practical. Investor cash flow uncertainty, and the need to maintain liquidity in these unprecedented times, has meant there is an excess amount of money at the very short end of the market. This has seen a number of market operators, now including the DMADF, offer nil or negative rates for very short term maturities. This is not universal, and MMFs are still offering a marginally positive return, as are a number of financial institutions for investments at the very short end of the yield curve.

Inter-local authority lending and borrowing rates have also declined due to the surge in the levels of cash seeking a short-term home at a time when many local authorities are probably having difficulties over accurately forecasting when disbursements of funds received will occur or when further large receipts will be received from the Government.

**d) Investment Treasury Indicator And Limit (Treasury Indicator TI-4)
Total Principal Funds Invested for Greater Than 365 days**

These limits are set with regard to the Council's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

The treasury indicator and limit proposed is:

Maximum principal sums invested > 365 days (TI-4)			
	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22
Principal sums invested > 365 days	5%	5%	5%

For its cash flow generated balances, the Council will seek to utilise its notice accounts, money market funds and short-dated deposits, (overnight to 100 days), in order to benefit from the compounding of interest.

5.7 Risk Benchmarking

These benchmarks are simple guides to minimise risk, so they may be breached from time to time, depending on movements in interest rates and counterparty criteria. The purpose of the benchmarks is that officers will monitor the current and trend position and amend the operational strategy to manage risk as conditions change. Any breach of the benchmarks will be reported, with supporting reasons in the mid-year or annual report.

a) Security –

The Council's **maximum** security risk benchmark for the current portfolio, when compared to historic default tables, is:

0.06% historic risk of default when compared to the whole portfolio for 1 year.

b) Liquidity

In respect of this area the Council seeks to maintain:

- Bank Overdraft: £100,000 East Renfrewshire Council
£25,000 East Renfrewshire Culture & Leisure Trust

c) Yield

Local Measures of yield benchmarks are:

Investments – Internal returns above the 7 day LIBID rate

5.8 End of year investment report

At the end of the financial year, the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) will report on its investment activity as part of the annual treasury report.

6 Performance Indicators

6.1 The CIPFA Code requires the Council to set performance indicators to assess the adequacy of the treasury function over the year. These are distinct historic indicators, as opposed to the prudential indicators, which are predominantly forward looking.

6.2 Debt Performance Indicators

- Average “Pool Rate” charged by the Loans Fund compared to Scottish Local Authority average Pool Rate:
Target is to be at or below the Scottish Average for 2020/21
- Average borrowing rate movement year on year:
Target is to maintain or reduce the average borrowing rate for the Council versus 2020/21.

6.3 Loan Charges

Loan Charges for 2021/22 are expected to be at or below the Revenue Budget estimate contained in the Council’s Financial Plans to be approved in February 2021, which are estimated as follows:

£m	2021/22 Estimate	2022/23 Estimate
Capital Repayments	4.929	4.600
Interest on Borrowing	3.777	5.124
Expenses	0.157	0.166
Total Loan Charges*	8.863	9.890

*The Loan Charges exclude the capital element of PPP repayments

7 Monitoring and Reporting

In line with the CIPFA Code the following formal reporting arrangements will be adopted:

Requirement	Purpose	Responsible Body	Frequency
Scrutiny of Treasury Management Strategy	Detailed scrutiny prior to annual approval by Council	Audit & Scrutiny Committee	Annually
Treasury Management Strategy	Reporting on Annual Strategy	Council	Annually prior to start of new financial year
Scrutiny of Treasury Management Mid-Year Report	Detailed scrutiny prior to approval by Council	Audit & Scrutiny Committee	Annually in October/November of the current year
Treasury Management Mid-Year Report	Mid-Year Performance Report	Council	Annually after reported to the Audit & Scrutiny Committee
Scrutiny of Treasury Management Annual Report	Detailed scrutiny prior to approval by Council	Audit & Scrutiny Committee	Annually in September/ October of the financial year
Treasury Management Annual Report	Annual Performance report for previous financial year	Council	Annually after reported to the Audit & Scrutiny Committee
Treasury Management Practices		Council	As appropriate
Treasury Management Policy Statement	Reviews and Revisions	Council	As required

8 Member and Officer Training

The CIPFA Code requires the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer) to ensure that both members and officers with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in this area. This Council will address this important issue by:

a) Elected Members

- Working with members to identify their training needs
- Working with the Link Group to identify appropriate training provision for elected members

b) Officers dealing with treasury management matters will have the option of various levels of training including:

- Treasury courses run by the Council's advisers
- Attendance at CIPFA treasury management training events
- Attendance at the CIPFA Scottish Treasury Management Forum and information exchanged via the Treasury Management Forum network

- Training identified as part of the Council's Performance Review & Development system in line with the approved Treasury Management Practices (TMPs).

ANNEXES

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ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS

Indicator Reference	Indicator	Page Ref.	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS							
Capital Expenditure Indicator							
PI-1	Capital Expenditure Limits		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	General Fund		41,286	63,386	58,918	28,152	12,374
	Housing		18,499	27,313	14,457	4,823	5,465
	Total		59,785	90,699	73,375	32,975	17,839
PI-2	Capital Financing Requirement		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	General Fund		199,463	243,853	282,475	290,425	283,779
	Housing		43,636	58,792	66,959	66,866	67,250
	Total		243,099	302,645	349,434	357,291	351,029
Affordability Indicator							
External Debt Indicators							
PI-3	Gross Debt		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	Borrowing		143,843	201,015	247,638	247,623	247,607
	Other Long Term Liabilities		78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598	56,750
	Total		222,594	274,560	315,816	310,221	304,357
PI-4	Operational Boundary for External Debt		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	Borrowing		163,947	229,154	280,870	293,957	293,556
	Other Long Term Liabilities		83,836	78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598
	Total		247,783	307,905	354,415	362,135	356,154
PI-5	Authorised Limit for External Debt		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	Borrowing		188,539	263,527	323,001	338,051	337,589
	Other Long Term Liabilities		83,836	78,751	73,545	68,178	62,598
	Total		272,375	342,278	396,546	406,229	400,187
Indicators of Prudence							
PI-6	(Under)/Over Gross Borrowing against the CFR		£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
			(20,505)	(28,085)	(33,618)	(47,070)	(46,672)
TREASURY INDICATORS							
TI-1	Upper Limit to Fixed Interest Rates based on Net Debt		100% of debt position				
TI-2	Upper Limit to Variable Interest Rates based on Net Debt		30% of debt position				
TI-3	Maturity Structure of Fixed Interest Rate Borrowing		15% maturing in any one year at the time of borrowing				
TI-4	Maximum Principal Sum invested greater than 365 days		5%	5%	5%	5%	5%

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ANNEX B: INTEREST RATE FORECASTS 2021 – 2024 The PWLB rates below are based on the new margins over gilts announced on 26th November 2020. PWLB forecasts shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Link Group Interest Rate View	9.11.20				(The Capital Economics forecasts were done 11.11.20)									
These Link forecasts have been amended for the reduction in PWLB margins by 1.0% from 26.11.20														
	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	
BANK RATE	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	
3 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	
6 month ave earnings	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	
12 month ave earnings	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20	
5 yr PWLB	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
10 yr PWLB	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	
25 yr PWLB	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	
50 yr PWLB	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	
Bank Rate														
Link	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	
Capital Economics	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	-	-	-	-	-	
5yr PWLB Rate														
Link	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.80	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
Capital Economics	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90	-	-	-	-	-	
10yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	
Capital Economics	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	-	-	-	-	-	
25yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	
Capital Economics	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.80	-	-	-	-	-	
50yr PWLB Rate														
Link	1.30	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.60	1.60	
Capital Economics	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	1.70	-	-	-	-	-	

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ANNEX C - LINK Group Economic Background (as at January 2021)


- **UK.** The key quarterly meeting of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee kept **Bank Rate** unchanged on 5.11.20. However, it revised its economic forecasts to take account of a second national lockdown from 5.11.20 to 2.12.20 which is obviously going to put back economic recovery and do further damage to the economy. It therefore decided to do a further tranche of **quantitative easing (QE) of £150bn**, to start in January when the current programme of £300bn of QE, announced in March to June, runs out. It did this so that “announcing further asset purchases now should support the economy and help to ensure the unavoidable near-term slowdown in activity was not amplified by a tightening in monetary conditions that could slow the return of inflation to the target”.
- Its forecasts appeared, at that time, to be rather optimistic in terms of three areas:
 - The economy would recover to reach its pre-pandemic level in Q1 2022
 - The Bank also expected there to be excess demand in the economy by Q4 2022.
 - CPI inflation was therefore projected to be a bit above its 2% target by the start of 2023 and the “inflation risks were judged to be balanced”.
- Significantly, there was no mention of **negative interest rates** in the minutes or Monetary Policy Report, suggesting that the MPC remains some way from being persuaded of the case for such a policy, at least for the next 6 -12 months. However, rather than saying that it “stands ready to adjust monetary policy”, the MPC this time said that it will take “whatever additional action was necessary to achieve its remit”. The latter seems stronger and wider and may indicate the Bank’s willingness to embrace new tools.
- One key addition to **the Bank’s forward guidance in August** was a new phrase in the policy statement, namely that “it does not intend to tighten monetary policy until there is clear evidence that significant progress is being made in eliminating spare capacity and achieving the 2% target sustainably”. That seems designed to say, in effect, that even if inflation rises to 2% in a couple of years’ time, do not expect any action from the MPC to raise Bank Rate – until they can clearly see that level of inflation is going to be persistently above target if it takes no action to raise Bank Rate. Our Bank Rate forecast currently shows no increase, (or decrease), through to quarter 1 2024 but there could well be no increase during the next five years as it will take some years to eliminate spare capacity in the economy, and therefore for inflationary pressures to rise to cause the MPC concern. **Inflation** is expected to briefly peak at just over 2% towards the end of 2021, but this is a temporary short lived factor and so not a concern.
- However, the minutes did contain several references to **downside risks**. The MPC reiterated that the “recovery would take time, and the risks around the GDP projection were judged to be skewed to the downside”. It also said “the risk of a more persistent period of elevated unemployment remained material”. Downside risks could well include severe restrictions remaining in place in some form during the rest of December and most of January too. **Upside risks** included the early roll out of effective vaccines.
- **COVID-19 vaccines.** We had been waiting expectantly for news that various COVID-19 vaccines would be cleared as being safe and effective for administering to the general public. The Pfizer announcement on 9th November was very encouraging as its 90% effectiveness was much higher than the 50-60% rate of effectiveness of flu vaccines which might otherwise have been expected. However, this vaccine has demanding cold storage requirements of minus 70c that impairs the speed of application to the general population. It has therefore been particularly welcome that the Oxford University/AstraZeneca vaccine has now also been approved which is much cheaper and only requires fridge temperatures for storage. The Government has 60m doses on order and is aiming to vaccinate at a rate

of 2m people per week starting in January, though this rate is currently restricted by a bottleneck on vaccine production; (a new UK production facility is due to be completed in June).

- These announcements, plus expected further announcements that other vaccines could be approved soon, have enormously boosted confidence that **life could largely return to normal during the second half of 2021**, with activity in the still-depressed sectors like restaurants, travel and hotels returning to their pre-pandemic levels; this would help to bring the unemployment rate down. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for these services. A comprehensive roll-out of vaccines might take into late 2021 to fully complete; but if these vaccines prove to be highly effective, then there is a possibility that restrictions could start to be eased, beginning possibly in Q2 2021 once vulnerable people and front-line workers have been vaccinated. At that point, there would be less reason to fear that hospitals could become overwhelmed any more. Effective vaccines would radically improve the economic outlook once they have been widely administered; it may allow GDP to rise to its pre-virus level a year earlier than otherwise and mean that the unemployment rate peaks at 7% in 2021 instead of 9%.
- **Public borrowing** was forecast in November by the Office for Budget Responsibility (the OBR) to reach £394bn in the current financial year, the highest ever peace time deficit and equivalent to 19% of GDP. In normal times, such an increase in total gilt issuance would lead to a rise in gilt yields, and so PWLB rates. However, the QE done by the Bank of England has depressed gilt yields to historic low levels, (as has similarly occurred with QE and debt issued in the US, the EU and Japan). This means that new UK debt being issued, and this is being done across the whole yield curve in all maturities, is locking in those historic low levels through until maturity. In addition, the UK has one of the longest average maturities for its entire debt portfolio, of any country in the world. Overall, this means that the total interest bill paid by the Government is manageable despite the huge increase in the total amount of debt. The OBR was also forecasting that the government will still be running a budget deficit of £102bn (3.9% of GDP) by 2025/26. However, initial impressions are that they have taken a pessimistic view of the impact that vaccines could make in the speed of economic recovery.
- Overall, **the pace of recovery** was not expected to be in the form of a rapid V shape, but a more elongated and prolonged one. The initial recovery was sharp after quarter 1 saw growth at -3.0% followed by -18.8% in quarter 2 and then an upswing of +16.0% in quarter 3; this still left the economy 8.6% smaller than in Q4 2019. It is likely that the one month national lockdown that started on 5th November, will have caused a further contraction of 8% m/m in November so the economy may have then been 14% below its pre-crisis level.
- **December 2020 / January 2021**. Since then, there has been rapid back-tracking on easing restrictions due to the spread of a new mutation of the virus, and severe restrictions were imposed across all four nations. These restrictions were changed on 5.1.21 to national lockdowns of various initial lengths in each of the four nations as the NHS was under extreme pressure. It is now likely that wide swathes of the UK will remain under these new restrictions for some months; this means that the near-term outlook for the economy is grim. However, the distribution of vaccines and the expected consequent removal of COVID-19 restrictions, should allow GDP to rebound rapidly in the second half of 2021 so that the economy could climb back to its pre-pandemic peak as soon as late in 2022. Provided that both monetary and fiscal policy are kept loose for a few years yet, then it is still possible that in the second half of this decade, the economy may be no smaller than it would have been if COVID-19 never happened. The significant caveat is if another mutation of COVID-19 appears that defeats the current batch of vaccines.

However, now that science and technology have caught up with understanding this virus, new vaccines ought to be able to be developed more quickly to counter such a development and vaccine production facilities are being ramped up around the world.


Chart: Level of real GDP (Q4 2019 = 100)



(the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.)

This recovery of growth which eliminates the effects of the pandemic by about the middle of the decade would have major repercussions for public finances as it would be consistent with the government deficit falling to around 2.5% of GDP without any tax increases. This would be in line with the OBR’s most optimistic forecast in the graph below, rather than their current central scenario which predicts a 4% deficit due to assuming much slower growth. However, Capital Economics forecasts assumed that there is a reasonable Brexit deal and also that politicians do not raise taxes or embark on major austerity measures and so, (perversely!), depress economic growth and recovery.

Chart: Public Sector Net Borrowing (as a % of GDP)




(the key describing each line in the above graph is in sequential order from top to bottom in parallel with the lines in the graph.)

- There will still be some **painful longer term adjustments** as e.g. office space and travel by planes, trains and buses may not recover to their previous level of use for several years, or possibly ever, even if vaccines are fully successful in overcoming the current virus. There is also likely to be a reversal of globalisation as this crisis has exposed how vulnerable long-distance supply chains are. On the other hand, digital services are one area that has already seen huge growth.
- **Brexit.** While the UK has been gripped by the long running saga of whether or not a deal would be made by 31.12.20, the final agreement on 24.12.20, followed by ratification by Parliament and all 27 EU countries in the following week, has eliminated a significant downside risk for the UK economy. The initial agreement only covers trade so there is further work to be done on the services sector where temporary equivalence has been granted in both directions between the UK and EU; that now needs to be formalised on a permanent basis. As the forecasts in this report were based on an assumption of a Brexit agreement being reached, there is no need to amend these forecasts.
- **Monetary Policy Committee meeting of 17 December.** All nine Committee members voted to keep interest rates on hold at +0.10% and the Quantitative Easing (QE) target at £895bn. The MPC commented that the successful rollout of vaccines had reduced the downsides risks to the economy that it had highlighted in November. But this was caveated by it saying, “Although all members agreed that this would reduce downside risks, they placed different weights on the degree to which this was also expected to lead to stronger GDP growth in the central case.” So, while the vaccine is a positive development, in the eyes of the MPC at least, the economy is far from out of the woods. As a result of these continued concerns, the MPC voted to extend the availability of the Term Funding Scheme, (cheap borrowing), with additional incentives for small and medium size enterprises for six months from 30.4.21 until 31.10.21. (The MPC had assumed that a Brexit deal would be agreed.)
- **Fiscal policy.** In the same week as the MPC meeting, the Chancellor made a series of announcements to provide further support to the economy: -
 - An extension of the COVID-19 loan schemes from the end of January 2021 to the end of March.
 - The furlough scheme was lengthened from the end of March to the end of April.
 - The Budget on 3.3.21 will lay out the “next phase of the plan to tackle the virus and protect jobs”. This does not sound like tax rises are imminent, (which could hold back the speed of economic recovery).
- The **Financial Policy Committee** (FPC) report on 6.8.20 revised down their expected credit losses for the banking sector to “somewhat less than £80bn”. It stated that in its assessment, “banks have buffers of capital more than sufficient to absorb the losses that are likely to arise under the MPC’s central projection”. The FPC stated that for real stress in the sector, the economic output would need to be twice as bad as the MPC’s projection, with unemployment rising to above 15%.
- **US.** The result of **the November elections** meant that while the Democrats gained the presidency and a majority in the House of Representatives, it looks as if the Republicans could retain their slim majority in the Senate provided they keep hold of two key seats in Georgia in elections in early January. If those two seats do swing to the Democrats, they will then control both Houses and President Biden will consequently have a free hand to determine policy and to implement his election manifesto.

- **The economy** had been recovering quite strongly from its contraction in 2020 of 10.2% due to the pandemic with GDP only 3.5% below its pre-pandemic level and the unemployment rate dropping below 7%. However, the rise in new cases during quarter 4, to the highest level since mid-August, suggests that the US could be in the early stages of a fourth wave. While the first wave in March and April was concentrated in the Northeast, and the second wave in the South and West, the third wave in the Midwest looks as if it now abating. However, it also looks as if the virus is rising again in the rest of the country. The latest upturn poses a threat that the recovery in the economy could stall. This is **the single biggest downside risk** to the shorter term outlook – a more widespread and severe wave of infections over the winter months, which is compounded by the impact of the regular flu season and, as a consequence, threatens to overwhelm health care facilities. Under those circumstances, states might feel it necessary to return to more draconian lockdowns.

COVID-19 hospitalisations per 100,000 population



- The restrictions imposed to control the spread of the virus are once again weighing on the economy with employment growth slowing sharply in November and retail sales dropping back. The economy is set for further weakness in December and into the spring. However, a \$900bn fiscal stimulus deal passed by Congress in late December will limit the downside through measures which included a second round of direct payments to households worth \$600 per person and a three-month extension of enhanced unemployment insurance (including a \$300 weekly top-up payment for all claimants). GDP growth is expected to rebound markedly from the second quarter of 2021 onwards as vaccines are rolled out on a widespread basis and restrictions are loosened.
- After Chair Jerome Powell unveiled the **Fed's adoption of a flexible average inflation target** in his Jackson Hole speech in late August 2020, the mid-September meeting of the Fed agreed by a majority to a toned down version of the new inflation target in his speech - that *"it would likely be appropriate to maintain the current target range until labour market conditions were judged to be consistent with the Committee's assessments of maximum employment and inflation had risen to 2% and was on track to moderately exceed 2% for some time."* This change was aimed to provide more stimulus for economic growth and higher levels of employment and to avoid the danger of getting caught in a deflationary "trap" like Japan. It is to be noted that inflation has

actually been under-shooting the 2% target significantly for most of the last decade, (and this year), so financial markets took note that higher levels of inflation are likely to be in the pipeline; long-term bond yields duly rose after the meeting. The FOMC's updated economic and rate projections in mid-September showed that officials expect to leave the fed funds rate at near-zero until at least end-2023 and probably for another year or two beyond that. There is now some expectation that where the Fed has led in changing its inflation target, other major central banks will follow. The increase in tension over the last year between the US and China is likely to lead to a lack of momentum in progressing the initial positive moves to agree a phase one trade deal.

- The Fed's meeting on **5 November** was unremarkable - but at a politically sensitive time around the elections. At its **16 December** meeting the Fed tweaked the guidance for its monthly asset quantitative easing purchases with the new language implying those purchases could continue for longer than previously believed. Nevertheless, with officials still projecting that inflation will only get back to 2.0% in 2023, the vast majority expect the fed funds rate to be still at near-zero until 2024 or later. Furthermore, officials think the balance of risks surrounding that median inflation forecast are firmly skewed to the downside. The key message is still that policy will remain unusually accommodative – with near-zero rates and asset purchases – continuing for several more years. This is likely to result in keeping Treasury yields low – which will also have an influence on gilt yields in this country.
- **EU.** In early December, the figures for Q3 GDP confirmed that the economy staged a rapid rebound from the first lockdowns. This provides grounds for optimism about growth prospects for next year. In Q2, GDP was 15% below its pre-pandemic level. But in Q3 the economy grew by 12.5% q/q leaving GDP down by “only” 4.4%. That was much better than had been expected earlier in the year. However, growth is likely to stagnate during Q4 and in Q1 of 2021, as a second wave of the virus has affected many countries: it is likely to hit hardest those countries more dependent on tourism. The €750bn fiscal support package eventually agreed by the EU after prolonged disagreement between various countries, is unlikely to provide significant support, and quickly enough, to make an appreciable difference in the countries most affected by the first wave.
- With inflation expected to be unlikely to get much above 1% over the next two years, **the ECB** has been struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target. It is currently unlikely that it will cut its central rate even further into negative territory from -0.5%, although the ECB has stated that it retains this as a possible tool to use. The ECB's December meeting added a further €500bn to the PEPP scheme, (purchase of government and other bonds), and extended the duration of the programme to March 2022 and re-investing maturities for an additional year until December 2023. Three additional tranches of TLTRO, (cheap loans to banks), were approved, indicating that support will last beyond the impact of the pandemic, implying indirect yield curve control for government bonds for some time ahead. The Bank's forecast for a return to pre-virus activity levels was pushed back to the end of 2021, but stronger growth is projected in 2022. The total PEPP scheme of €1,850bn of QE which started in March 2020 is providing protection to the sovereign bond yields of weaker countries like Italy. There is therefore unlikely to be a euro crisis while the ECB is able to maintain this level of support. However, as in the UK and the US, the advent of highly effective vaccines will be a game changer, although growth will struggle before later in quarter 2 of 2021.

- **China.** After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1, economic recovery was strong in Q2 and then into Q3 and Q4; this has enabled China to recover all of the contraction in Q1. Policy makers have both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that has been particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy has benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors help to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies. However, this was achieved by major central government funding of yet more infrastructure spending. After years of growth having been focused on this same area, any further spending in this area is likely to lead to increasingly weaker economic returns in the longer term. This could, therefore, lead to a further misallocation of resources which will weigh on growth in future years.
- **Japan.** A third round of fiscal stimulus in early December took total fresh fiscal spending this year in response to the virus close to 12% of pre-virus GDP. That's huge by past standards, and one of the largest national fiscal responses. The budget deficit is now likely to reach 16% of GDP this year. Coupled with Japan's relative success in containing the virus without draconian measures so far, and the likelihood of effective vaccines being available in the coming months, the government's latest fiscal effort should help ensure a strong recovery and to get back to pre-virus levels by Q3 2021 – around the same time as the US and much sooner than the Eurozone.
- **World growth.** World growth will have been in recession in 2020. Inflation is unlikely to be a problem for some years due to the creation of excess production capacity and depressed demand caused by the coronavirus crisis.
- Until recent years, world growth has been boosted by increasing **globalisation** i.e. countries specialising in producing goods and commodities in which they have an economic advantage and which they then trade with the rest of the world. This has boosted worldwide productivity and growth, and, by lowering costs, has also depressed inflation. However, the rise of China as an economic superpower over the last thirty years, which now accounts for nearly 20% of total world GDP, has unbalanced the world economy. The Chinese government has targeted achieving major world positions in specific key sectors and products, especially high tech areas and production of rare earth minerals used in high tech products. It is achieving this by massive financial support, (i.e. subsidies), to state owned firms, government directions to other firms, technology theft, restrictions on market access by foreign firms and informal targets for the domestic market share of Chinese producers in the selected sectors. This is regarded as being unfair competition that is putting western firms at an unfair disadvantage or even putting some out of business. It is also regarded with suspicion on the political front as China is an authoritarian country that is not averse to using economic and military power for political advantage. The current trade war between the US and China therefore needs to be seen against that backdrop. It is, therefore, likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a **reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries** from dependence on China to supply products. This is likely to produce a backdrop in the coming years of weak global growth and so weak inflation.

Summary

Central banks are, therefore, likely to support growth by maintaining loose monetary policy through keeping rates very low for longer. Governments could also help a quicker recovery by providing more fiscal support for their economies at a time when total debt is affordable due to the very low rates of interest. They will also need to avoid significant increases in taxation or austerity measures that depress demand in their economies.

If there is a huge surge in investor confidence as a result of successful vaccines which leads to a major switch out of government bonds into equities, which, in turn, causes government debt yields to rise, then there will be pressure on central banks to actively manage debt yields by further QE purchases of government debt; this would help to suppress the rise in debt yields and so keep the total interest bill on greatly expanded government debt portfolios within manageable parameters. It is also the main alternative to a programme of austerity.

INTEREST RATE FORECASTS

Brexit. The interest rate forecasts provided by Link in paragraph 4.3 were predicated on an assumption of a reasonable agreement being reached on trade negotiations between the UK and the EU by 31.12.20. There is therefore no need to revise these forecasts now that a trade deal has been agreed. Brexit may reduce the economy's potential growth rate in the long run. However, much of that drag is now likely to be offset by an acceleration of productivity growth triggered by the digital revolution brought about by the COVID crisis.

The balance of risks to the UK

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably now skewed to the upside, but is still subject to some uncertainty due to the virus and the effect of any mutations, and how quick vaccines are in enabling a relaxation of restrictions.
- There is relatively little UK domestic risk of increases or decreases in Bank Rate and significant changes in shorter term PWLB rates. The Bank of England has effectively ruled out the use of negative interest rates in the near term and increases in Bank Rate are likely to be some years away given the underlying economic expectations. However, it is always possible that safe haven flows, due to unexpected domestic developments and those in other major economies, could impact gilt yields, (and so PWLB rates), in the UK.

Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- **UK government** takes too much action too quickly to raise taxation or introduce austerity measures that depress demand in the economy.
- **UK - Bank of England** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **Eurozone sovereign debt crisis**. The ECB has taken monetary policy action to support the bonds of EU states, with the positive impact most likely for "weaker" countries. In addition, the EU agreed a €750bn fiscal support package. These actions will help shield weaker economic regions for the next two or three years.

However, in the case of Italy, the cost of the virus crisis has added to its already huge debt mountain and its slow economic growth will leave it vulnerable to markets returning to taking the view that its level of debt is unsupportable. There remains a sharp divide between northern EU countries favouring low debt to GDP and annual balanced budgets and southern countries who want to see jointly issued Eurobonds to finance economic recovery. This divide could undermine the unity of the EU in time to come.

- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**, which could be undermined further depending on extent of credit losses resultant of the pandemic.
- **German minority government & general election in 2021.** In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. The CDU has done badly in subsequent state elections but the SPD has done particularly badly. Angela Merkel has stepped down from being the CDU party leader but she will remain as Chancellor until the general election in 2021. This then leaves a major question mark over who will be the major guiding hand and driver of EU unity when she steps down.
- **Other minority EU governments.** Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland and Belgium also have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU, and they had threatened to derail the 7 year EU budget until a compromise was thrashed out in late 2020. There has also been a rise in anti-immigration sentiment in Germany and France.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in China, Iran or North Korea, but also in Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates

- **UK** - a significant rise in inflationary pressures e.g. caused by a stronger than currently expected recovery in the UK economy after effective vaccines are administered quickly to the UK population, leading to a rapid resumption of normal life and return to full economic activity across all sectors of the economy.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflationary pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a rapid series of increases in Bank Rate to stifle inflation.

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ANNEX D

Objectives of each type of Permitted Investment instrument

1. DEPOSITS

The following forms of 'investments' are actually more accurately called deposits as cash is deposited in an account until an agreed maturity date or is held at call.

- a) **Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility (DMADF).** This offers the lowest risk form of investment available to local authorities as it is effectively an investment placed with the Government. It is also easy to use as it is a deposit account and avoids the complications of buying and holding Government issued treasury bills or gilts. As it is low risk it also earns low rates of interest. However, it is very useful for authorities whose overriding priority is the avoidance of risk. The longest period for a term deposit with the DMADF is 6 months.
- b) **Term deposits with high credit worthiness banks and building societies.** This is the most widely used form of investing used by local authorities. It offers a much higher rate of return than the DMADF (dependent on term). The authority will ensure diversification of its portfolio of deposits ensuring that an approved maximum can be placed with any one institution or group. In addition, longer term deposits offer an opportunity to increase investment returns by locking in high rates ahead of an expected fall in the level of interest rates. At other times, longer term rates can offer good value when the markets incorrectly assess the speed and timing of interest rate increases. This form of investing therefore, offers a lot of flexibility and higher earnings than the DMADF. Where it is restricted is that once a longer term investment is made, that cash is locked in until the maturity date.
- c) **Call accounts with high credit worthiness banks and building societies.** The objectives are as for 1b, but there is instant access to recalling cash deposited. This generally means accepting a lower rate of interest than that which could be earned from the same institution by making a term deposit. Some use of call accounts is highly desirable to ensure that the authority has ready access to cash when needed to pay bills.
- d) **Fixed term deposits with variable rate and variable maturities (structured deposits).** This line encompasses ALL types of structured deposits. There has been considerable change in the types of structured deposits brought to the market over the last few years, some of which are already no longer available. In view of the fluidity of this area, this is a generic title for all structured deposits and provides greater flexibility to adopt new instruments as and when they are brought to the market. Approval will be sought before making deposits using instruments under this generic title.

2. DEPOSITS WITH COUNTERPARTIES CURRENTLY IN RECEIPT OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT / OWNERSHIP

These banks offer another dimension of creditworthiness in terms of Government backing through either partial or full direct ownership. The view of this authority is that such backing makes these banks attractive institutions with whom to place deposits, and that will remain our view if the UK sovereign rating were to be downgraded in the coming year.

- a) **Term deposits with high credit worthiness banks which are fully or semi nationalised.** As for 1b, but Government full (or substantial partial) ownership, implies that the Government stands behind this bank and will be deeply committed to providing whatever support that may be required to ensure the continuity of that bank. This authority considers that this indicates a low and acceptable level of residual risk.

3. COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT SCHEMES STRUCTURED AS OPEN ENDED INVESTMENT COMPANIES (OEICS)

- a) **Government liquidity funds.** These are the same as money market funds (see below) but only invest in government debt issuance with highly rated governments. Due to the higher quality of underlying investments, they offer a lower rate of return than MMFs. However, their net return is typically on a par with the DMADF, but with instant access.
- b) **Money Market Funds (MMFs).** By definition, MMFs are AAA rated and are widely diversified, using many forms of money market securities including types which this authority does not currently have the expertise or capabilities to hold directly. However, due to the high level of expertise of the fund managers and the huge amounts of money invested in MMFs, and the fact that the weighted average maturity (WAM) cannot exceed 60 days, MMFs offer a combination of high security, instant access to funds, high diversification and good rates of return compared to equivalent instant access facilities. They are particularly advantageous in falling interest rate environments as their 60 day WAM means they have locked in investments earning higher rates of interest than are currently available in the market. MMFs also help an authority to diversify its own portfolio as e.g. a £2m investment placed directly with HSBC is a 100% risk exposure to HSBC whereas £2m invested in a MMF may end up with say £10,000 being invested with HSBC through the MMF. For authorities particularly concerned with risk exposure to banks, MMFs offer an effective way of minimising risk exposure while still getting much better rates of return than available through the DMADF.
- c) **Ultra-short dated bond funds.** These funds are similar to MMFs, can still be AAA rated but have variable net asset values (VNAV) as opposed to a traditional MMF which has a Constant Net Asset Value (CNAV). They aim to achieve a higher yield and to do this either take more credit risk or invest out for longer periods of time, which means they are more volatile. These funds can have WAM's and Weighted Average Life (WAL's) of 90 – 365 days or even longer. Their primary objective is yield and capital preservation is second. They therefore are a higher risk than MMFs and correspondingly have the potential to earn higher returns than MMFs.

4. SECURITIES ISSUED OR GUARANTEED BY GOVERNMENTS

The following types of investments are where an authority directly purchases a particular investment instrument, a security, i.e. it has a market price when purchased and that value can change during the period the instrument is held until it matures or is sold. The annual earnings on a security is called a yield i.e. it is normally the interest paid by the issuer divided by the price you paid to purchase the security unless a security is initially issued at a discount e.g. treasury bills.

- a) **Treasury bills.** These are short term bills (up to 18 months, but usually 9 months or less) issued by the Government and so are backed by the sovereign rating of the UK. The

yield is higher than the rate of interest paid by the DMADF and another advantage compared to a term deposit in the DMADF is that they can be sold if there is a need for access to cash at any point in time. However, there is a spread between purchase and sale prices so early sales could incur a net cost during the period of ownership.

- b) **Gilts.** These are longer term debt issuance by the UK Government and are backed by the sovereign rating of the UK. The yield is higher than the rate of interest paid by the DMADF and another advantage compared to a term deposit in the DMADF is that they can be sold if there is a need for access to cash at any point in time. However, there is a spread between purchase and sale prices so early sales may incur a net cost. Market movements that occur between purchase and sale may also have an adverse impact on proceeds. The advantage over Treasury bills is that they generally offer higher yields the longer it is to maturity (for most periods) if the yield curve is positive.

5. SECURITIES ISSUED BY CORPORATE ORGANISATIONS

The following types of investments are where an authority directly purchases a particular investment instrument, a security, i.e. it has a market price when purchased and that value can change during the period the instrument is held until it is sold. The annual earnings on a security is called a yield i.e. is the interest paid by the issuer divided by the price you paid to purchase the security. These are similar to the previous category but corporate organisations can have a wide variety of credit worthiness so it is essential for local authorities to only select the organisations with the highest levels of credit worthiness. Corporate securities are generally a higher risk than government debt issuance and so earn higher yields.

- a) **Certificates of deposit (CDs).** These are shorter term securities issued by deposit taking institutions (mainly financial institutions). They are negotiable instruments, so can be sold ahead of maturity and also purchased after they have been issued. However, that liquidity can come at a price, where the yield could be marginally less than placing a deposit with the same bank as the issuing bank.
- b) **Corporate bonds.** These are (long term) bonds (usually bearing a fixed rate of interest) issued by a financial institution, company or other non-government issuer in order to raise capital for the institution as an alternative to issuing shares or borrowing from banks. They are generally seen to be of a lower creditworthiness than government issued debt and so usually offer higher rates of yield.
- c) **Floating rate notes.** These are bonds on which the rate of interest is established periodically with reference to short-term interest rates.

6. OTHER

- a) **Property fund.** This is a collective investment fund specialising in property. Rather than owning a single property with all the risk exposure attached to one property in one location rising or falling in value, maintenance costs, tenants actually paying their rent / lease etc., a collective fund offers the advantage of diversified investment over a wide portfolio of different properties. This can be attractive for authorities who want exposure to the potential for the property sector to rise in value. However, timing is critical to entering or leaving this sector at the optimum times of the property cycle of rising and falling values.

Typically, the minimum investment time horizon for considering such funds is at least 3-5 years.

- b) **Loans to 3rd parties.** These are loans provided to third parties at either market rates of interest or below market rates. Each application is supported by the service rationale behind the loan and requires member approval. These loans are highly illiquid and may exhibit credit risk.
- c) **Loans to a Local Authority Company/ Partnership or Charity.** These loans have to be supported by the service rationale /business case and requires member approval. In general these loans will involve some form of security or clear cash flow that is available to service the debt. These loans are highly illiquid and may exhibit credit risk.
- d) **Shares in Hub schemes.** These are shares in projects that have both Council and the Scottish Government as participants. As such the Council are well placed to influence and ensure the successful completion of the projects, which are based on robust business cases with a cash flow from the public sector organisations. These investments are highly illiquid with a low credit risk.

ANNEX E

Credit and Counterparty Risk Management

Permitted Investments, Associated Controls and Limits for East Renfrewshire Council and East Renfrewshire Culture & Leisure Trust

Type of Investment	Treasury Risks	Mitigating Controls	Limits
a. Deposits with the Debt Management Account Facility (UK Government) (Very low risk)	This is a deposit with the UK Government and, as such, counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Deposits can be between overnight and 6 months	Little mitigating controls required. As this is a UK Government investment, the monetary limit is high.	£20m Maximum 6 months
b. Deposits with other local authorities or public bodies (Very low risk)	These are considered quasi UK Government debt and, as such counterparty risk is very low, and there is no risk to value. Liquidity may present a problem as deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties can apply. Deposits with non-local authority bodies will be restricted to the overall credit rating criteria	Little mitigating controls required for local authority deposits, as this is a quasi UK Government investment. Non-local authority deposits will follow the approved credit rating criteria	£5m (per body), maximum 6 months
c. Money Market Funds (MMFs) Low Volatility Net Asset Value (LVNAV) (Low to very low risk)	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where the MMFs has a “AAA” rated status from either Fitch, Moody’s or Standard & Pooors.	£10m per fund/£60m overall
d. Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds (Low risk)	Pooled cash investment vehicle which provides very low counterparty, liquidity and market risk. These will primarily be used as liquidity instruments.	Funds will only be used where they have a “AAA” rated status from either Fitch, Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s.	£10m overall, part of category c.
e. Call account deposit accounts with financial institutions	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. These type of investments have no risk to	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured	As shown in the counterparty

(banks and building societies) (Low risk depending on credit rating)	value, liquidity is high and investment can be returned at short notice	primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by use of additional market intelligence.	listing (Annex F)
f. Term deposits with financial institutions (banks and building societies) (Low to medium risk depending on period & credit rating)	These tend to be low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is low and term deposits can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty, and penalties may apply.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	As shown in the counterparty listing (Annex F)
g. UK Government Gilts and Treasury Bills (Very low risk)	These are marketable securities issued by the UK Government and, as such, counterparty and liquidity risk is very low, although there is potential risk to value arising from an adverse movement in interest rates (no loss if these are held to maturity).	Little counterparty mitigating controls are required, as this is a UK Government investment. The potential for capital loss will be reduced by limiting the maximum monetary and time exposures.	£5m, maximum 6 months
h. Certificates of Deposit with Financial Institutions (Banks & Building Societies) (Low risk)	These are short dated marketable securities issued by financial institutions and as such counterparty risk is low, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above. There is risk to value of capital loss arising from selling ahead of maturity if combined with an adverse movement in interest rates (no loss if these are held to maturity). Liquidity risk will normally be low.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	Dependent on institution as listed in counterparty listing in annex F
i. Structured deposit facilities with banks and building societies	These tend to be medium to low risk investments, but will exhibit higher risks than categories (a), (b) and (c) above.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured	Dependent on institution as listed in

(escalating rates, de-escalating rates etc.) (Low to medium risk depending on period & credit rating)	Whilst there is no risk to value with these types of investments, liquidity is very low and investments can only be broken with the agreement of the counterparty (penalties may apply).	primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	counterparty listing in annex F
j. Corporate Bonds (Medium to high risk depending on period and credit rating)	These are marketable securities issued by financial and corporate institutions. Counterparty risk will vary and there is risk to value of capital loss arising from selling ahead of maturity if combined with an adverse movement in interest rates. Liquidity risk will be low.	The counterparty selection criteria approved above restricts lending only to high quality counterparties, measured primarily by credit ratings from Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Corporate bonds will be restricted to those meeting the base criteria. Day to day investment dealing with this criteria will be further strengthened by the use of additional market intelligence.	Dependent on institution as listed in counterparty listing in annex F
k. Investment properties	These are non-service properties which are being held pending disposal or for a longer-term rental income stream. These are highly illiquid assets with high risk to value (the potential for property prices to fall or for rental voids)	In larger investment portfolios, some small allocation of property based investment may counterbalance/compliment the wider cash portfolio. Property holding will be re-valued regularly and reported annually with gross and net rental streams.	No limit
l. Loans to third parties, including soft loans	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid.	Each third party loan requires Member approval and each application is supported by the service rationale behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default.	£0.5m
m. Loans to a local authority company/ partnership or charity	These are service investments either at market rates of interest or below market rates (soft loans). These types of investments may exhibit credit risk and are likely to be highly illiquid	Each loan to a local authority company requires Member approval and each application is supported by the service rationale/business case behind the loan and the likelihood of partial or full default.	£1m

n. Shares in Hub Schemes	These are investments that are exposed to the success or failure of individual projects and are highly illiquid.	The Council and Scottish Government (via the SFT) are participants in and party to the governance and controls within the project structure. As such they are well placed to influence and ensure the successful completion of the project's term. These projects are based on robust business cases with a cash flow from public sector organisations (i.e. low credit risk)	Investment limited to HUB schemes where the Council is a major participant
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The Monitoring of Investment Counterparties

The status of counterparties will be monitored regularly. The Council receives credit rating and market information from Link Asset Services, including when ratings change, and counterparties are checked promptly. On occasion rating may be downgraded when an investment has already been made. The criteria used are such that a minor downgrading should not affect the full receipt of the principal and interest. Any counterparty failing to meet the criteria will be removed from the list immediately (with the exception of the Council's Bank) and if required new counterparties which meet the criteria will be added to the list with written permission of the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer).

Annex F

EAST RENFREWSHIRE COUNCIL

ORGANISATIONS APPROVED FOR THE INVESTMENT OF SURPLUS FUNDS

Banking Group	Individual Counterparty	Limits	
		Deposit	Transaction
Bank of England	Debt Management Office	£20m	£10m
	UK Treasury Bills	£5m	£5m
Barclays Banking Group	Barclays Bank	£5m	£5m
Goldman Sachs International Bank		£5m	£5m
HSBC		£5m	£5m
Lloyds Banking Group:	Bank of Scotland	£12.5m	£10m
Royal Bank of Scotland Group:	Royal Bank of Scotland	}	£5m
	National Westminster Bank		
Santander Group	Santander UK PLC	£7.5m	£7.5m
Standard Chartered Bank		£5m	£5m
Clydesdale Bank		£0	£0
Building Societies			
Nationwide		£5m	£5m
Local Authorities			
All Local Authorities including Police & Fire (per fund)		£5m	£5m
Money Market Funds and Ultra-Short Dated Bond Funds			
Maximum limit of £10m per fund,		£60m	£10m

Credit Ratings

	Fitch		Moody's		S&P	
	LT	ST	LT	ST	LT	ST
Minimum Criteria	A-	F1	A3	P-1/P-2	A	A-1/A-2

(Unless Government backed)

(Please note credit ratings are not the sole method of selecting counterparty)

Limit

Investment of surplus funds is permitted in each of the above organisations, with the limits set on an individual basis by the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer).

The limit may only be exceeded or another organisation approved with the written permission of the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer).

Deposit Periods

The maximum period for any deposit is currently set at 6 months, based on the Link Assets Services suggested Duration Matrix, with the exception of the Bank of Scotland which is set at 365 days. These limits can only be exceeded with the written permission of the Head of Accountancy (Chief Financial Officer).

Hub scheme deposit periods are dependent on the lifetime of the associated scheme.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CIPFA	Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy
CIPFA Code	Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes
CFR	Capital Financing Requirement is the estimated level of borrowing or financing needed to fund capital expenditure.
Consent to Borrow	Para 1 (1) of Schedule 3 of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1975 (the 1975 Act) effectively restricts local authorities to borrowing only for capital expenditure. Under the legislation Scottish Ministers may provide consent for local authorities to borrow for expenditure not covered by this paragraph, where they are satisfied that the expenditure should be met by borrowing.
Gilts	A gilt is a UK Government liability in sterling, issued by HM Treasury and listed on the London Stock Exchange. The term “gilt” or “gilt-edged security” is a reference to the primary characteristic of gilts as an investment: their security. This is a reflection of the fact that the British Government has never failed to make interest or principal payments on gilts as they fall due.
LIBID	London Interbank Bid Rate The rate at which banks bid on Eurocurrency Deposits, being the rate at which a bank is willing to borrow from other banks.
MPC	Monetary Policy Committee
NHT	National Housing Trust initiative undertaken in partnership with the Scottish Futures Trust.
Other Long Term Liabilities	Balance sheet items such as Public Private Partnership (PPP), and leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments.
PPP	Public-Private Partnership.
Prudential Indicators	The Prudential Code sets out a basket of indicators (the Prudential Indicators) that must be prepared and used in order to demonstrate that local authorities have fulfilled the objectives of the Prudential Code.
QE	Quantitative Easing
Treasury Indicators	These consist of a number of Treasury Management Indicators that local authorities are expected to ‘have regard’ to, to demonstrate compliance with the Treasury Management Code of Practice.

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